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 Abstract  
Social constructivism and Harry Collins epistemological theory put focus on the sociology of 
scientific knowledge, scientific practice and the nature of expertise. From his theory, inspired by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life’ and David Bloor’s strong programme, Collins has from the 
nineties until today argued against the possibilities of creating a general artificial intelligence, which 
can be compared with any cognitive functions that a human accommodates. Collins epistemological 
theory withholds aspects of knowledge basics, transfer and communication that are said to be unique 
and/or can only be performed by humans, which together with the problem of socialization constitute 
the demarcation line between a human and what can be achieved by an artificial intelligence, AI.  
Two areas of AI-research that in recent years have reported progress are autonomous vehicles and 
games. Autonomous vehicles are supposed to, in the near future, be able to handle different types of 
environments, interpret conflicting signals and ‘make’ ethical decisions. Game-playing AIs are said to 
be able to create their own set of rules and perform a basic communication. If these advancements are 
correct the AIs seem to challenge Collins critique of a potential general AI by exhibiting social 
sensibility, being able to adapt to different social and/or cultural settings and improvise when needed 
plus developing a (limited) language in order to communicate.  
In the paper I clarify what is at stake in the AI-debate, and intend to empirical test Harry Collins’ 
theories, and if his epistemological theory is affected by the reported and anticipated progress in the 
AI-research. My findings are that Collins’ epistemological theory is severely affected due to him, in 
his argumentation, slipping towards naturalism in order to construct a solid demarcation line, 
safeguarding against moving goalposts and a resistance to acknowledge the possibility of an AI being 
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 Syfte: To clarify what is at stake in the AI-debate, and how, and if the demarcation line Harry 
Collins drew, between human and AI, is unchanged. This in order to empirically test if 
his epistemological thesis still is valid. 
   
Teori: Discourse study.  
Metod: Philosophical investigation based on Harry Collins’ critique of the possibility of a 
general AI in Artificial Experts Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines, and Tacit 
and Explicit Knowledge.  
Resultat:  Harry Collins’ epistemological theory is severely affected due to him, in his 
argumentation, slipping towards naturalism in order to construct a solid demarcation 
line, safeguarding against moving goalposts and a resistance to acknowledge the 
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The past two years’ reports in media, from involved companies, and research-labs have emphasised 
advancements of AI-research in the areas autonomous vehicles and game-playing AIs. To mention 
two examples; In the beginning of 2016 AlphaGo, a version of Google’s AI DeepMind, won a game 
of Go for the first time, a game regarded by many impossible for an AI to conquer; During 2017 test-
areas for autonomous vehicles started popping up in many countries around the globe, e.g. DriveMe 
(Test Site Sweden 2018) in Gothenburg, Sweden, where 100 self-driving cars are planned to drive on 
public roads during 2018. Technical innovations such as these urge us to ask questions in terms of 
where the use of AI-technology is heading, and what impact it will have in a future where AIs might 
become more intelligent1 than us?  
With the possibility of a human-level AI moral and ethical issues needs to be taken into account, such 
as liability and safety of human beings. Safe-making the human race, and way of living, are placed on 
top of the agenda in many areas of society at present, e.g. the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Legal Affairs’ report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics to 
present EU-wide rules on the topic of robotics and AI (European Parliament 2017) and the report The 
Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation co-written by 26 
authors from academia, civil society, and industry (Brundage et al. 2018). There are several practical 
aspects that need to be addressed in a future inhabited by technology that might be smarter, and better, 
than a human in completing a work-task. These are important to handle, think through thoroughly, and 
make sure rules and laws are explicit enough to cover a multitude of possible scenarios. But it need to 
be noted that questions like these assume that artificial intelligence is possible, at least at such a high 
level of performance that it might present risks to the safety and wellbeing of humans, and this is not 
something scientists agree upon ever will happen.   
In this paper the fundamental question that will be investigated is if an artificial intelligence 
comparable to the human intelligence is possible. The question will be addressed by placing Harry 
Collins’ critique of the AI-project in one ring-corner and the research-status of the current AI-
project(s) in the other. Collins is chosen due to his position in the epistemological chicken debate, 
where he assigns uniqueness to the human and social explanations. In the debate Collins was criticized 
by Bruno Latour and Michel Callon, advocates of the Actor Network Theory, ANT (Latour& Callon 
1992). Collins claims on the possibility of the AI-project presuppose his epistemological theories and 
empirical investigations of contemporary AI-research allow new entry points to this debate over 
human uniqueness. Here lay my interest, and reason for narrowing down to investigate Collins’ 
                                                      
1 In the case of a super intelligent AI it is already assumed that a human level AI is possible. Scientists who believe that an AI 
with the same level of intelligence as a human is possible usually also withhold that a super intelligent AI is achievable. 
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critique of, and disinclination to, the possibility of a human level AI. If Collins is wrong in his 
statement that a human level AI is not possible it will have consequences for and/or severely damage 
his epistemological claims.  
As theory for the paper I aim at applying a (critical) discourse analysis approach by analysing the 
writings of Harry Collins together with the presented result of AI-research, and placing Collins’ 
arguments against the possibilities of a general AI, and his epistemological theory, in the practical 
context of todays research in AI, conducted within the areas of autonomous cars and game-playing 
AIs. The discourse analysis is inspired by the content analysis presented by Simone Natale and Andrea 
Ballatore (2017), which in many aspects follows the foundation of critical discourse analysis as 
presented by Norman Fairclough in Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language 
(1995). My analysis does not follow Fairclough’s three critical discourse analysis’ dimensions; ‘text’, 
‘discursive practice’ and ‘social practice’. Instead I choose to use the framework presented by 
Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips (2002) by which it is suggested that ‘the researcher can 
delineate the different discourses, focusing on the following: the aspects of the world to which the 
discourses ascribe meaning; the particular ways in which each of the discourses ascribes meaning; the 
points on which there is an open struggle between different representations; and any understandings 
naturalized in all of the discourses as common-sense.’ (Jørgensen & Philips 2002, pp. 145) Hereby I 
follow the route suggested by Jørgensen and Phillips of placing focus on the interplay between the 
discourses, as presented by Collins and the AI-research, to sift out the (social) consequences if one of 
the two discourses was accepted instead of the other.  
Collins was one of the main critics of the possibilities of AI during the nineties with the book Artificial 
Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines, which in 2010 was followed by his updated 
critique in Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. Due to Collins’ objective my focus will be put on 
strong/general artificial intelligence, which simplified is a human level AI, one that can be compared 
with any cognitive functions that a human being may have.  
Two influential, and the most prominent, philosophers in the epistemological critique of the AI-
project, together with Collins, during the nineties and until today are John R. Searle and Hubert 
Dreyfus. I will present their theories, and also a brief list of arguments focusing on the difference 
between (human) brains and computers, in the section ‘Critique of the AI-project’. This is done in 
order to clarify Collins’ position and situate his critique in the AI-discussions, and also how he relate 
his critique to Searle’s and Dreyfus’.  
With the paper I am going to clarify what is at stake in the AI-debate, and how, and if the demarcation 
line Collins drew, between human and AI, has evaporated or might have been moved. This in order to 
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highlight and sift out the possible remains of Collins critique and how (if) his epistemological thesis 
still is valid.  
My hypothesis is that the reported progress in AI-research, the last couple of years, challenge Collins’ 
arguments against a possible general AI by exhibiting social sensibility, being able to adapt to 
different social and/or cultural setting and improvise when needed plus developing a (limited) 
language in order to communicate.  
I will take a closer look at primarily two areas of AI-research, autonomous vehicles and game-playing 
AIs, and analyse if the way these function and perform refute the uniqueness of humans and the need 
for socialisation as stated by Collins. Autonomous vehicles are chosen on the basis of the promise that 
they will be able to function in all environments, overcome obstacles such as harsh weather, 
conflicting signals, and also to be able to make complicated decisions in situations where an ethical 
dilemma is present, e.g. to choose between driving into a group of people or crashing into one person.2 
Game-playing AIs are chosen since they are presented as being able to create their own set of rules 
and perform basic communication.  
                                                      
2 The subject of machine ethics is the topic of the website Moral Machine, which provide a platform for ’ 1) building a 
crowd-sourced picture of human opinion on how machines should make decisions when faced with moral dilemmas, and 2) 
crowd-sourcing assembly and discussion of potential scenarios of moral consequence.’ (Moral Machine 2018)  
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Background 
Driven by fantasies, possibilities and promises the project of creating artificial intelligence has moved 
from more theoretical to more practical oriented work in the past decade. What started out with 
experimental machines a few centuries ago, where it became possible to test ‘hypotheses about the 
mechanisms of thought and intelligent behaviour and thereby demonstrate mechanisms that formerly 
existed only as theoretical possibilities’ (Buchanan 2005, pp. 53), has evolved into a multi-billion 
industry where the focus seems to be directed towards ‘production’ of new and more advanced 
products.  
To understand what is at stake, and the origin of thoughts, a brief historical flashback is needed. 
During the 1700th century Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Blaise Pascal and Wilhelm Schickard 
designed calculating machines that mechanized arithmetic. Leibniz has been described as a 
philosopher who ‘seemed to see the possibility of mechanical reasoning devices using rules of logic to 
settle disputes’ (Buchanan 2005, pp. 53). 
The innovations inspired Charles Babbage to start working on a method that could be used 
mechanically and would remove the human error factor. Babbage invented the ‘Difference Engine’, 
completed in 1832, to compile mathematical tables and in 1856 he presented the ‘Analytical Engine’, 
which is regarded as the world's first general-purpose computer.3  
In the early 20th century innovations in electronics and computers gave rise to new visions of 
possibilities. Contemporary movements in society and science influenced research in computer 
science, and computers were regarded as experimental devices to understand the nature of intelligent 
thought and action. Buchanan quotes Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon: 
‘Any rational decision may be viewed as a conclusion reached from certain 
premises.… The behaviour of a rational person can be controlled, therefore, if 
                                                      
3 ‘On the analogy of a modern digital computer, the design principle of the Analytical Engine can be divided to: 
  1. Input. From 1836 on, punched cards […] were the basic mechanism for feeding into the machine both numerical data and 
the instructions on how to manipulate them. 
  2. Output. Babbage’s basic mechanism was always a printing apparatus, but he had also considered graphic output devices 
even before he adopted punched cards for output as well as input. 
  3. Memory. For Babbage this was basically the number axes in the store, though he also developed the idea of a hierarchical 
memory system using punched cards for additional intermediate results that could not fit in the store. 
  4. Central Processing Unit. Babbage called this the Mill. Like modern processors it provided for storing the numbers being 
operated upon most immediately (registers); hardware mechanisms for subjecting those numbers to the basic arithmetic 
operations; control mechanisms for translating the user-oriented instructions supplied from outside into detailed control of 
internal hardware; and synchronization mechanisms (a clock) to carry out detailed steps in a carefully timed sequence. The 
control mechanism of the Analytical Engine must execute operations automatically and it consists of two parts: the lower 
level control mechanism, controlled by massive drums called barrels, and the higher level control mechanism, controlled by 
punched cards, developed by Jacquard for pattern-weaving looms and used extensively in the beginning of 1800s.’ (Charles 
Babbage 2017)  
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the value and factual premises upon which he bases his decisions are specified 
for him.’ 
(Simon 1974 as cited by Buchanan 2005, pp. 54) 
An important influence from this time is Norbert Wiener. In his research he noted that feedback is a 
key feature of all life forms and that plants, as well as animals, change their actions in response to their 
environment, ideas that would develop into the field of cybernetics.  
‘Cybernetics is interdisciplinary in nature; based on common relationships between 
humans and machines, it is used today in control theory, automation theory, and 
computer programs to reduce many time-consuming computations and decision-
making processes formerly done by human beings.’ 
(Encyclopædia Britannica 2017) 
With the cybernetics the thoughts of ‘thinking machines’ where articulated. As Jean-Pierre Dupuy 
writes when he presents the cybernetics’ first thesis, ‘[…] to think is to compute as a certain class of 
machines do – amounted to analysing and describing what it is to think […]’ (Dupuy 2000, pp. 4-5). 
During the fifties the research program of artificial intelligence started to develop and with that the 
focus was shifted from, what Dupuy describes as, ‘the mechanization of mind’ that had been the focus 
of the cybernetics, to ‘the anthropomorphization of the machine’. The question asked instead became; 
‘Can a machine think?’ (Dupuy 2000, pp. 5) 
A key figure was Alan Turing who with his paper Computing machinery and intelligence, 1950, 
proposed the ‘Turing Test’, an imitation game that should function as a test of a machine’s ability to 
‘think’ and exhibit intelligent behaviour equivalent, or not possible to distinguish from, that of a 
human. The Turing Test has influenced debates over artificial intelligence until present days.  
Between 1946–1953 ten cybernetic conferences where held, known as the ‘Macy Conferences’, in 
New York that are associated with the development of cybernetics. A few years later, 1956, the 
‘Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence’ was held in New Hampshire, a 
workshop that is considered as the formal start of artificial intelligence as a field of research.  
A few years earlier, 1952, Arthur Lee Samuel, working for IBM, wrote a chess-playing program that 
supposedly was the first self-learning program, and thereby the first AI program.4  
Three other meetings focusing on AI are viewed as central in the establishing of artificial intelligence  
                                                      
4 Samuel is said to have coined the term ‘machine learning’ 1959.  
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as a ‘full-fledged field of research’; ‘Session on Learning Machines’ in 1955, ‘Summer Research 
Project on Artificial Intelligence’ in 1956, and in 1958 the symposium ‘Mechanization of Thought 
Processes’5 (Nilsson 2010, pp.73). At the gatherings two papers6 were presented that have become 
fundamental to most of the later work done in enabling computers to ‘see’ something that is of 
importance in developing autonomous vehicles. During the following decades improvements were 
made in pattern recognition, speech, language processing and ‘understanding’, and robotics.  
The early AI-research conducted is not to be perceived as without setbacks, or as evolutionary 
continuous line of progress. During the years the research had to deal with decreased funding and 
disbelief from fellow scientist and society, these periods are called ‘AI-winters’. Larry Hardesty notes 
that differences in the approach towards the research had a historical context, and that the 
controversies were influenced by the progress in technological research and the current ‘state of 
research mind’ (Hardesty 2017). 
By the beginning on the nineties fresh approaches to programing were established. Earlier work was, 
by philosopher John Haugeland, given the name GOFAI, Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence, 
and described as; ‘uses heuristic search and discrete collections of symbolically represented facts and 
rules’ used by those handling ‘logical representations and logical reasoning methods’ (Nilsson 2010, 
pp. 413). 
 
Contemporary research in artificial intelligence 
When closing in on today’s AI-research my focus will be placed on autonomous vehicles and game-
playing AIs in order to present what is regarded as ‘milestones’ in each of these AI-research areas. 
The nineties saw the emergence of the World Wide Web, games becoming more realistic using 3D-
graphics, robotic pets being introduced, and the first RoboCup7 taking place. During the 21st century 
advancements has been made in e.g. digital personal assistants, robotics, natural language processing, 
and image analysing. 
                                                      
5 Session on Learning Machines’ was held in conjunction with the Western Joint Computer Conference in Los Angeles, 
‘Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence’ at Dartmouth College 1956, and the ‘Mechanization of Thought 
Processes’ at the National Physical Laboratory, UK. 
6 Wesley Clark and Belmont Farley of MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory concerning experiments conducted that explored the 
networks of neurons, especially in pattern recognition, wrote one of the papers. The experiments were mostly simulated on 
computers and the findings came to be called neural networks. Two other papers on the same subject with a different 
approach was written by Gerald P. Dinneen respectively Oliver Selfridge, also from MIT's Lincoln Laboratory. (Nilsson 
2010, pp. 74) 
7 RoboCup is an annual robotic competition. The intention of the competition is stated on their webpage ‘[...] to use RoboCup 
as a vehicle to promote robotics and AI-research […]’ (RoboCup 2018)  
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In 1995 the researchers Dean Pomerleau and Todd Jochem, from Carnegie Mellon University, carried 
through a tour named ‘No Hands Across America’, from Pittsburg to San Diego. It was done using a 
car equipped with a computer running the software RALPH, Rapidly Adapting Lateral Position 
Handler. RALPH used video images to navigate and steer the vehicle while Pomerleau and Jochem 
handled the throttle and brake. This was one of the first (almost) autonomous vehicles. RALPH 
controlled the vehicle for at least 98 % of the trip, which was reported as a success, ‘[…] they 
demonstrated that with the right sensors and programming, a computer could indeed steer a car over 
thousands of miles of freeway driving.’ (Baker 2017) 
In 2005 STANLEY, created by Stanford University in cooperation with the Volkswagen Electronic 
Research Laboratory, ERL, won the 2005 DARPA (Department of Advanced Research Projects 
Agency's) Grand Challenge, a 132-mile course through the rough terrain of the Mojave dessert. To 
‘sense’ the environment STANLEY was outfitted with cameras, radar, and laser rangefinders together 
with on-board software to command the steering, braking, and acceleration (Russell & Norvig 2010, 
pp. 28). The year after DARPA Urban Challenge took place, which tested autonomous vehicles ability 
to drive in traffic, obeying traffic rules, avoiding pedestrians, other vehicles and other obstacles. Boss, 
a car constructed by Carnegie Mellon University in partnership with General Motors Corporation8 
won the challenge (Spice 2007).   
In 1994 Chinook, a checkers playing computer program developed at the University of Alberta, won 
the world champion title in a match against Marion Tinsley. Even though Chinook’s victory was 
admirable it did not use any form of machine learning. The creators programmed all of Chinook’s 
knowledge. A few years later, 1997, Deep Blue, IBM’s chess-playing program, defeated the world 
champion Garry Kasparov, and became the first computer to win a chess match. Programming Deep 
Blue required a different approach than had been used to program Chinook. The reason being that in 
chess there are considerably more possible moves and to program all would have been impossible. 
Deep Blue was able to analyse 2-2.5 million positions per second, many more possible moves than 
any human, an advantage named ‘brute force computing’ (Campbell, Hoane & Hsu 2001, pp. 59). 
Deep Blue’s victory was looked upon as remarkable since chess playing was ‘once thought to 
epitomize human intellection’ (Bostrom 2014, pp. 603–604), as Douglas Hofstader wrote;  
‘[…] the way humans represent a chess situation in their minds is far more 
complex than just knowing which piece is on which square, coupled with 
knowledge of the rules of chess. It involves perceiving configurations of several 
related pieces, as well as knowledge of heuristics, or rules of thumb, which pertain 
                                                      
8 Today General Motors Company. 
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to such higher-level chunks. Even though heuristic rules are not rigorous in the 
way that the official rules are, they provide shortcut insights into what is going on 
on the board, which knowledge of the official rules does not. This much was 
recognized from the start; it was simply underestimated how large a role the 
intuitive, chunked understanding of the chess world plays in human chess skill.’ 
(Hofstader 1979, pp. 603–604)   
I will return to today’s research further ahead in my paper, and I herby leave the historical 
background. Before continuing it should be emphasized that AI-research has not been a 
straightforward business. Worries have been vividly illustrated in works of fiction as well as presented 
by opponents to the AI-field. Concerns dealing with an unknown, and maybe frightening, future, as 
well as euphemistically reports in media have most likely had impact on the research in artificial 
intelligence’s possibilities, such as the refutation of funding and support, as well as the lack there of, 
from politicians, fellow scientists and society. The development of AI could be analysed from how 
expectations has influenced the research in both positive and a negative ways, as Mads Borup et. al. 
notes on the subject of science and innovation; 
‘As such, future-oriented abstractions are among the most important objects of 
enquiry for scholars and analysts of innovation. Such expectations can be seen to 
be fundamentally ‘generative’, they guide activities, provide structure and 
legitimation, attract interest and foster investment. They give definition to roles, 
clarify duties, offer some shared shape of what to expect and how to prepare for 
opportunities and risks. Visions drive technical and scientific activity, warranting 
the production of measurements, calculations, material tests, pilot projects and 
models. As such, very little in innovation can work in isolation from a highly 
dynamic and variegated body of future-oriented understandings about the future.’ 
(Borup, Brown, Konrad & Van Lente 2006, pp.285–286)  
Simone Natale and Andrea Ballatore identify three dominant patterns in the construction of the AI 
myth;  
‘(1) the recurrence of analogies and discursive shifts, by which ideas and concepts 
from other fields were employed to describe the functioning of AI technologies; (2) 
a rhetorical use of the future, imagining that present shortcomings and limitations 
will shortly be overcome and (3) the relevance of controversies around the claims 
of AI, which we argue should be considered as an integral part of the discourse 
surrounding the AI myth.’ 
(Natale & Ballatore 2017, pp. 1) 
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Shortly lingering by the these patterns it seems obvious that especially the second pattern is prevalent 
in the past and present reporting and writing of progress and success in developing autonomous 
vehicles.  
I have chosen not to investigate further into the sociology of expectations in my paper, but find it 
important to keep in mind that the social impact on the AI-area’s hype is an essential factor of how the 
field has evolved, and in the way media and companies present progress.   
 
Artificial intelligence and learning  
Different ways of learning and how the software improves its performance and skills is central in 
programming artificial intelligence agents (software), especially in the subset machine learning. 
Russell and Norvig presents three types of feedback that determine three main types of learning; 
unsupervised learning, reinforcement learning and supervised learning. Unsupervised learning is when 
‘the agent learns patterns in the input even though no explicit feedback is supplied.’ With 
reinforcement learning the agent ‘learns from a series of reinforcements – rewards or punishments.’ In 
supervised learning the agent ‘observes some example input-output pairs and learns a function that 
maps from input to output.’ They also mention semi-supervised learning, which is described as 
learning when we are ‘given a few labelled examples and must make what we can of a large collection 
of unlabelled examples.’ (Russell & Norvig 2010, pp. 695) 
The mutual component in all AI-learning is the software’s preconditions, which depends on four 
factors: 
• ‘Which component is to be improved. 
• What prior knowledge the agent already has. 
• What representation is used for the data and the component. 
• What feedback is available to learn from.’  
(Russell & Norvig 2010, pp. 694) 
Recent AI-research has combined the different ways of learning, e.g. hybrid reinforcement learning9 
that works by using a multitude of agents that each has a specific task to fulfil, and a top agent who, 
from the suggestions feed by all the other agents, decides the outcome or action handles the control of 
                                                      
9 Hybrid Reward Architecture for Reinforcement Learning, developed, and named, by researches from Microsoft Maluuba 
and McGill University in Montreal, Canada. (van Seijen et. al 2017) 
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all the agents.10 Another example is deep reinforcement learning11, which combines reinforcement 
learning and deep learning (a description of deep learning follows bellow).  
 
Terminology  
To initiate my investigation a brief rundown of the terms used in the discussion of AI and, for my 
paper central, in Harry Collins epistemological theory and argumentation against the possibility of 
creating a general AI will be done.  
 
Artificial Neural Network (ANN)  
‘Neural nets are a means of doing machine learning, in which a computer learns to perform some task 
by analysing training examples.’ (Hardesty 2017) The idea of neural nets are modelled loosely on the 
human brain, and when the term first was introduced, 1944 by McCullough and Pitts, research was 
conducted using the term in both neuroscience and computer science. The neural nets of today are 
usually organized in layers and data moves through them in only one direction. This is called ‘feed-
forward’. The net is made up of nodes and each node can have several connections in the layer below. 
The ‘down-under’ connections feeds the node with data and the data is, by the node, feed-forward to 
the above node(s) that it is connected to. Each node processes the data that it receives from the layer 
below, but does not automatically send everything ahead. 
 
Deep learning  
Deep learning is a part of the broader term machine learning, and uses lots of layers in a neural 
network to analyse data at different abstraction (Vincent 2016). Deep learning software attempt to 
mimic the way our brains work; ‘the activity in layers of neurons in the neocortex, the wrinkly 80 
percent of the brain where thinking occurs’ (Hof 2013). The software models are described as ‘loosely 
related to information processing and communication patterns in a biological nervous system, such as 
neural coding that attempts to define a relationship between various stimuli and associated neuronal 
responses in the brain.’ (Olshausen1996 as referred to by Wikipedia 2018)    
                                                      
10 Hybrid reinforcement learning was used to make top-score at playing Ms. Pacman during June 2017. Microsoft. (Linn 
2017)  
11 Deep reinforcement learning was used in Google’s Go-playing DeepMind version, AlphaGo, which won a five-game 
match against a professional Go-player in March 2016. 
11 
Deep learning needs a lot of data and time to process the data, how long depends on the work that it is 
set to do. Each layer has a specific task to perform and, as with neural nets, a training period is needed 
where either a human or the system itself corrects the program with the goal of it to get better at the 
assigned task.  
 
Machine learning  
Machine learning is a ‘discipline concerned with the implementation of computer software that can 
learn autonomously’ (Encyclopædia Britannica 2017). Several approaches to machine learning exist. 
A machine learning software is able to learn from data and also to make predictions on data, which 
makes it useful e.g.in situations where programming explicit algorithms will make the performance of 
the software less successful. Two simple examples are email filtering and programs aiming at 
detecting potential data breach.  
 
Mimeomorphic and polimorphic action  
Collins defines two types of actions, mimeomorphic action and polimorphic action. 
‘Actions that are intentional but nevertheless mimic the world of mechanical cause and effect are 
called mimeomorphic actions.’ (Collins 2010, pp. 55)  
‘Polimorphic actions are actions that can only be executed successfully by a person who understands 
the social context.’ (Collins 2010, Preface ix)  
Mimeomorphic actions are described as those where a human act mechanically, a situation where 
humans can be seen as continuous with the world of mechanisms, and Collins hold that humans can 
sometimes choose to act in this way even if their actions are intentional12.  
Polimorphic actions are described as actions ‘that require different behaviours for successful 
instantiation depending on context and require different interpretations of the same behaviour 
depending on context’, (Collins 2010, pp. 125) and humans are said to use collective tacit knowledge13 
to handle them.  
                                                      
12 The definition of intentional in Collins’ context is ’meditated through the world of meaning’. (Collins 2010, pp. 55)  
13 I will return to collective tacit knowledge, CTK, and describe it more thorough. In short CTK is described as having to do 
with the way society is constituted and a form of tacit knowledge. 
12 
Narrow/weak artificial intelligence 
Narrow or weak14 artificial intelligence is designed to do a specific narrow task. The narrow/weak AI 
works towards a predefined goal, and is limited by its algorithms in performing its task(s). Examples 
of narrow/weak AIs are robots used for manufacturing, chat-bots and digital personal assistants.  
 
Social cartesianism 
Social cartesianism is by Collins defined as the essential difference between humans and animals. No 
sharp distinction between animals and humans is drawn, but rather the difference is in abilities: ‘ The 
issue is the marked difference in abilities between a species that possesses fully developed languages 
and cultures and one that does not.’ (Collins 2010, pp. 126) 
 
Socialness 
Socialness according to Collins is described as ‘the ability to absorb ways of going on from the 
surrounding society without being able to articulate the rules in detail.’ (Collins 2010, pp. 125) 
Socialness is when personal traits correspond to significant cultural differences.   
 
Strong/general artificial intelligence 
A strong, general or full artificial intelligence is one that can be compared with any cognitive 
functions that a human being may have and is thereby in its essence not different from a real human 
mind. This implies that a general AI has mental capabilities and functions that are of the same 
functional status as a human brain. The AI is in principle not limited by its algorithms and is able to 
learn, adopt and act flexible by interacting with surroundings such as databases, physical environment, 
etc.  
 ‘According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the 
mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to 
formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. But 
according to strong AI, the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; 
rather, the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that 
computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have 
                                                      
14 Weak artificial intelligence can also be a definition of the thought held by the group of people who think that a general, 
strong, artificial intelligence is not possible. The terms weak and strong artificial intelligence where introduced by John 
Searle in Minds, brains, and programs 1980.  
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other cognitive states. In strong AI, because the programmed computer has 
cognitive states, the programs are not mere tools that enable us to test 
psychological explanations; rather, the programs are themselves the explanations.’ 
(Searle 1980, pp. 417) 
Some researcher, e.g. Marvin Minsky and Nils Nilsson, use the term human-level AI, which is 
described as ‘machines that think, that learn and that create’ (Russel & Norvig 2010, pp. 27). 
14 
Critique of the AI-project 
Doubts of and arguments against the AI-project have been around from the start. Of interest for this 
paper are the arguments that speak against artificial intelligence, and are presented, from an 
epistemological point of view, especially arguments putting forward the uniqueness of the human 
being as the reason for the impossibility of an artificial intelligence.  
Arguments against the AI-project can be divided into those who say that an AI cannot be constructed 
and those who argue that it should not. Should not arguments focus on ethical and political questions 
in relation to research and innovations in AI, e.g. if it is ethically tenable to conduct research in the 
area of artificial intelligence, or if society should subsidize innovations that will have as a 
consequence that different occupational groups lose their jobs. My focus here is on the former, the 
cannot argument(s). These arguments focus on questions of social ontology and epistemology, which 
are the ones Harry Collins is concerned with, and that are in line with my research questions. 
 
Arguments against artificial intelligence  
Harry Collins is not alone to argue against the possibility of creating general AIs. I will briefly present 
two other critiques, John Searle’s and Hubert L. Dreyfus’, together with a short overview of some of 
the arguments against the possibility of a disembodied AI. What these all have in common is that they 
might seem similar to Collins’ arguments but he rejects them in parts.  
 
The need of intentionality – John Searle   
John Searle argue that computational processes lack something that humans (and animals) have, 
namely intentionality. He presents two propositions, (1) and (2), from which he draws three 
consequences, (3), (4) and (5), that are central to his arguments.  
(1) ‘Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the 
brain.  
(2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of 
intentionality.’  
(Searle 1980, pp. 417) 
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Searle assumes that (1) is an empirical fact about the casual relations that actually takes place between 
mental processes and brains. He clarifies his stance by stating that this presents the idea that certain 
brain processes are sufficient for intentionality.  
(3) ‘The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by 
instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. 
(4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal 
to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. 
(5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed 
just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the 
human brain. This follows from 2 and 4.’  
(Searle 1980, pp. 417) 
In his line of argument Searle states that the only way a machine could think is if it would be possible 
for it to have ‘[…] internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains’, which he think is not possible 
since he believe that no computer-program is ‘[…] by itself is sufficient for thinking’. (Searle 1980, 
pp. 417) 
Searle describe intentionality as follows: 
‘Intentionality is by definition that feature of certain mental states by which they 
are directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world. Thus, beliefs, 
desires, and intentions are intentional states; undirected forms of anxiety and 
depression are not.’  
(Searle 1980, pp. 424) 
Searle’s thesis contains the central term ‘understanding’ that accordingly ‘[…] implies both the 
possession of mental (intentional) states and the truth (validity, success) of these states’ (Searle 1980, 
pp. 424), and in he put focus only on the former. A computer-program does not have knowledge of 
what the symbols they use mean. Nilsson writes ‘[…] computational processes lack “aboutness” […]’ 
(Nilsson 2010, pp. 383). Here rests the difference between a human and a machine in Searle’s 
argument, because when a human use a word s/he knows what it is about.  
A thought experiment is used to illustrate his arguments concerning understanding, ‘the Chinese 
Room’, and Nilsson presents a short summery of the main question at stake together with Searle’s 
answer.  
‘Searle's question, essentially, is “Can it be said that the room (containing Searle, 
the rules, and the batches of Chinese symbols) `understands' Chinese?” Searle 
16 
claims the answer is “no” because all that is going on is ‘formal symbol 
manipulation’ without understanding what the symbols mean.  
(Nilsson 2010, pp. 386)  
 
John Searle versus Harry Collins 
Searle’s and Collins’ argument differ in that Searle refers to internal states of the single individual 
while Collins place the uniqueness of the human intelligence in the collective interaction in society. 
The knowledge, ‘construction’ of knowledge, and exchange of knowledge that come about when 
humans socialize in society and different scientific areas all depends on the socialization, which 
Collins stress to be fundamental in human learning, knowledge transfer, communication and 
interaction.  
In relation to the Chinese Room Collins think that Searle’s deduction ‘that the mere reproduction of an 
action, […] does not demonstrate that consciousness or understanding or meaning is involved’ 
(Collins 2010, pp. 127) is correct. He does not agree with Searle on the goal of his inquiry though, 
since his own aim is to investigate whether the though experiment provide ‘the conditions under which 
humans, who normally accomplish fluency in language only through internalizing tacit knowledge 
through socialization, could accomplish something indistinguishable from fluency by referring only to 
a lookup table and doing nothing more than string transformation’ (Collins 2010, pp. 127). 
Unlike Searle Collins traces the conclusion from his description of how context is provided in life by 
both conversation and what is happening in the world, ‘questions and answers are sensitive to context 
and, […] language changes’ (Collins 2010, pp. 129). 
Searle has continued to be active in the debates concerning AI and in short his arguments at present 
are that consciousness is a biological phenomena and as such no stranger than the body or water. But it 
is a biological phenomenon that we have not been able to describe epistemological yet15. In principle 
he sees no obstacle in us being able to build an artificial brain, one that thinks as a human, but what 
needs to be done first is that we need to figure out how the brain works, and this has not been done, 




                                                      
15 Searle hold that ontological is consciousness subjective. (Searle 2015) 
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The need of global processes and being in the world – Hubert L. Dreyfus  
Hubert L. Dreyfus wrote the paper Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence after he had spent the summer 
at the RAND Corporation16 in Santa Monica, California. It was written as a reflection, and a critique, 
of the current reported successes in digital computing and the expected future. Dreyfus, like Collins, 
place his focus on the cannot argument(s) and to what extent a digital computer can be programmed to 
exhibit simple intelligent behaviour characteristic of e.g. children. In the paper he argues that the 
reason for computers having difficulties to simulate cognitive processes is because they exclude three 
forms of information processes that are said to be fundamental for humans, fringe consciousness, 
essence/accident discrimination, and ambiguity tolerance. (Dreyfus 1965, pp. iii).  
Fringe consciousness is described as a two-pieced ability where a person at the same time is able to 
focus on the details in a certain situation, or task, and simultaneously be aware of and take into 
account the overall situation, or task. What is lacking when AI-research fails is accordingly the cases 
where global awareness is necessary, and the ‘counting out’ ability is not enough, or feasible.  
Essence/accident discrimination is described as the ability to distinguish the accidental from the 
essential, and as illustration Dreyfus quotes Max Wertheimer’s writing in Productive Thinking: 
‘The process [of structuring a problem] does not involve merely the given parts and their 
transformations. It works in conjunction with material that is structurally relevant but s selected from 
past experience […] [40:195].’ (Dreyfus 1965, pp. 29) 
Ambiguity tolerance is described as the ability to handle and reduce ambiguity, e.g. in using a natural 
language. This ability is said to presuppose the two other abilities, where fringe consciousness is said 
to make a person aware of cues in the context, and a sense of what is important in the context allow 
the person to ignore what is irrelevant. What ambiguity then allows the person to do is to use the 
information and narrow down on the remaining spectrum of possible parsings and meanings as much 
as is required ‘without requiring the resulting interpretation to be absolutely unambiguous.’ (Dreyfus 
1965, pp. 34–35) 
The combination of the forms of information processing permits what is called perspicuous grouping, 
which Dreyfus, inspired by Wittgenstein, describes as ‘understanding which consists in seeing 
connections’ (Dreyfus 1965, pp. 45). According to Dreyfus the processes are essential for intelligent 
behaviour but not something computers are able to make use of. It is the way that a brain compared 
with computer processes information that is the weak spot. He defines four things that a machine, 
                                                      
16 ‘The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make 
communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is non-profit, nonpartisan, 
and committed to the public interest.’ (RAND 2018)  
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which is to be counted as equal to human performance, must be able to do; ’1) Distinguish the 
essential from the inessential features of a particular instance of a pattern; 2) Use cues which remain 
on the fringes of consciousness; 3) Take account of the context; 4) Perceive the individual as typical, 
i.e., situate the individual with respect to a paradigm case.’ (Dreyfus 1965, pp. 46)  
Nilsson emphasize that Dreyfus does not think that creating an AI is impossible as such but that an AI 
is not possible due to the way computers works. The human intelligence is derives from us ‘being in 
the world’, not because we are guided by rules, and this is linked to the definition of a body. Nilsson 
cites a conversation he has had with Dreyfus; ‘[…] a model of our particular way of being embedded 
and embodied such that what we experience is significant for us in the particular way that it is. That is, 
we would have to include in our program a model of a body very much like ours with our needs, 
desires, pleasures, pains, ways of moving, cultural background, etc.’ (Nilsson 2010, pp. 392) 
This is in line with what Dreyfus wrote when foreboding about the future of AI development; 
‘Significant developments in artificial intelligence in the remaining two areas must await computers of 
an entirely different sort, of which the only existing prototype is the little-understood human brain.’ 
(Dreyfus 1965, pp. iii) 
 
Hubert L. Dreyfus versus Harry Collins 
Compared to Collins it occurs as if Dreyfus, at least in principle, leaves a door open for the potential 
AI, given that a new type of computers, or rather programs, is innovated. Even if they have 
similarities, e.g. stressing the context and taking into account the ‘whole’ picture, they differ in 
important parts. Collins major point is the social connections, the social networks that humans are 
entwined in, and while Dreyfus also highlights the context it is not to the same extent as Collins. 
Dreyfus seems to place the individual in the centre rather than the collective, as Collins does.  
In Tacit and Explicit Knowledge Collins criticise Dreyfus, and the influence he has had, stating that ‘it 
reflects much less about the nature of knowledge itself than is usually imagined.’ The reason he writes 
is that Dreyfus only describe ‘one or two special kinds of human skill and it entirely ignores the most 
fundamental subdivision of human expertise: that between expertise of the sensory motor kind and 
expertise of the social kind.’ (Collins 2010, pp. 124) 
 
Arguments against a disembodied AI 
There are several other objections to artificial intelligence, and several of these argue that a 
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disembodied AI is not possible. Nilsson presents a list of arguments focusing on the differences 
between brains and computers.  
• ‘Computers have perhaps hundreds of processing units whereas brains have 
trillions. 
• Computers perform billions of operations per second whereas brains need perform 
only thousands. 
• Computers are subject to crashes whereas brains are fault tolerant. 
• Computers use binary signals whereas brains work with analogue ones. 
• Computers do only what their programmers tell them to do whereas brains are 
creative. 
• Computers perform serial operations whereas brains are massively parallel. 
• Computers are constrained to be ”logical” whereas brains can be “intuitive.” 
• Computers are programmed whereas brains learn.’ 
(Nilsson 2010, pp. 392–393) 
Some of the stated differences Collins would agree upon, and they fit into his theory, but neither is 
sufficient to his arguments, as has been foreboded in his responses to Searle’s and Dreyfus’ theories. 
The ones that could fit into his theory are that brains are creative, are massively parallel, can be 
intuitive and that they learn. Although Collins stresses that there are differences between a 
computer/AI and the human brain it is not the functions that are put in focus but rather the way 
humans (brain and body) are socialized and part of the collectivity. The differences listed above are 
illustrative in the sense of functions and abilities but as arguments against a potential general AI they 
are far from enough for Collins.  
 
Harry Collins epistemological theory and artificial intelligence 
Collins’ arguments against the possibility of creating an artificial intelligence stems from his theories 
of knowledge and expert(s). In Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, first 
published 1985, he, inspired by David Bloor’s the Strong Programme and the later Ludwig 
Wittgenstein presents his Empirical Programme of Relativism, EPOR, consisting of three stages:  
1) ‘Demonstrating the interpretative flexibility of experimental data.  
2) Showing the mechanisms by which potentially open-ended debates are actually 
brought to a close - that is, describing closure mechanisms.  
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3) Relating the closure mechanisms to the wider social and political structure.’  
(Collins 1992, pp. 25–26)  
Collins empathizes that the solution to the problem of induction is achieved by a shift of focus from 
‘how we could be certain in principle about induced regularities’ to ‘how we actually come to be 
certain about regularities in practice’ (Collins 1992, pp. 6). With the ‘sociological resolution of the 
problem of induction’ he distances himself from his predecessors, by placing the explanation-power in 
the social structures rather than in safe-proving the structures of how science is conducted. The 
influences from the later Wittgenstein, and his term ‘forms of life’, are visible in Collins thoughts; in 
his focus on language as a vital part of socialization as well as his focus on the ‘how we come to be 
certain’.  
The social structures are said to answer to the experimenters regress, which occurs when science uses 
the reproduction of experiments to prove that they are possible to reproduce, and in the definition of 
what is the ‘correct’ way to carry out experiments in a new field of research. According to Collins the 
regress is broken and closure is reached by negotiation within the appropriate scientific community, 
rather than scientific reason. ‘There is, then, no set of 'scientific' criteria which can establish the 
validity of findings in this field. The experimenters' regress leads scientists to reach for other criteria 
of quality.’ (Collins 1992, pp. 88)  
The central problem, and the one that constitute the bridge to Collins critique of artificial intelligence, 
is called the socialization problem, and Collins defines two aspects that need to be settled for the 
problem to be solved. The first deals with how humans approach and handle questions and answers. 
Collins holds that this is structured by the unfolding context; to ask, and reply to, a question and to 
follow up with further questions, or answers, the ‘speaker’ needs to be sensitive to what is going on 
around her/him. The second aspect focus on ‘the right way to do things’, which only is possible to 




A central pivot is the difference Collins outlines between explicit and tacit knowledge, a line of 
arguments started in Artificial Experts17 and refined in Tacit and Explicit Knowledge.  
                                                      
17 In Artificial Experts Collins urges that the conventional status hierarchy of knowledge undervalues practical abilities, a 
statement that also is made to favour the skills a person with sociological or philosophical training have, and what makes 
them ‘unique’ in completing the picture of knowledge. 
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Collins emphasize that all explicit knowledge rests upon tacit knowledge, and that no concept of tacit 
knowledge would exist without one of explicit knowledge. With tacit knowledge he thinks that the 
mistake made is the failure to separate different types of tacit knowledge, and separates out three. 
‘These have to do, respectively, with the contingencies of social life (relational tacit knowledge), the 
nature of the human body and brain (somatic tacit knowledge), and the nature of human society 
(collective tacit knowledge) – RTK, STK, CTK.’ (Collin 2010, pp. Preface x) 
Collins hold, inspired by Michael Polanyi’s texts, that it is a mistake to believe that tacit knowledge is 
harder to understand, or obscure, compared with explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is normal life, 
and what humans and animals have been doing ‘[…] without anyone telling anything to anything or 
anyone’ (Collin 2010, pp. 7). Collins does not find anything strange with things being done but not 
being told stating that all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge18, and explicit 
knowledge does not have any significance if the tacit is missing. But, he continues, the idea of tacit 
could not occur, as being special, until the explicit, or explicability became to be granted as the 
ordinary. Note that the relation is not symmetrical. The dependence is in the first case where the 
explicit, with Collins words, is parasitical on the tacit handles knowledge itself. The later, where the 
tacit is parasitical on the explicit, handles the idea of the tacit.  
 
Explicit knowledge, strings, communication and language  
 ‘ “Explicit” is something to do with something being conveyed as a result of strings impacting with 
things.’ (Collins 2010, pp. 57) 
Collins holds that the basic level is strings that together with entities are described as the interaction 
between physical objects. Strings are said to be flexible; a string can be an entity, and an entity a 
string, depending on the situation, and they always contain information but are not always used to 
transmit information. Information in this context is described as ‘[…] a physical feature of a string that 
refers to the number and arrangements of its elements.’ (Collins 2010, pp. 16) The terms ‘string’, 
‘strings’ and ‘elements’ are used interchangeable, with the explanation that they are ‘just entities’. 
Strings are said to be able to affect entities in four ways:  
(1) ‘A string is a physical thing, so it can have a physical impact.  
(2) A string is a pattern, so it can impress, print, or “inscribe” a similar pattern on 
an entity in many different ways.  
[…] 
                                                      
18 This line of thought is also founded on thoughts presented by Michael Polanyi.  
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(3) a string can communicate “mechanically,” as when a new piece of code is fed 
into a computer or a human reacts to a sound in a reflex-like way; and  
(4) a string can communicate by being interpreted as meaningful by a human.’ 
(Collins 2010, pp. 16–17)  
Collins describes (1) and (2) as less fundamental than (3) and (4), with which a change can come 
about in a way that can cause the affected entity to do something or give it the ability to perform 
something that the entity could not do before. (1), (2) and (3) are said to be possible for other entities 
than humans, but (4) is unique for humans.  
In (3) and (4) communication is a vital part, and inspired by Wittgenstein Collins writes: 
‘A communication takes place when an entity, P, is made to do something or comes to be able to do 
something that it could not do before as a result of the transfer of a string.’ (Collins 2010, pp. 20–21)  
Stating that communication is not always simple, Collins presents five enabling conditions for 
communication illustrated with an example of a simple multiplication. The fifth is of importance in his 
argument, and the fourth shows us were he places the line between the computer/software and a 
human. The fourth condition is described as; ‘The transfer of a string plus a significant fixed physical 
change in the receiving entity gives rise to a communication.‘ (Collins 2010, pp. 31) Image an old 
computer at which a calculation-program has been installed and the multiplication instructions have 
been typed but the computer cannot proceed due to lack of memory. If the computer shall be able to 
do the sum a new memory unit must be installed.    
The fifth condition is described as; ‘The transfer of a string plus a significant flexible and responsive 
physical change in the entity gives rise to a communication.‘ (Collins 2010, pp. 31) This condition 
requires a fluency in a language, and only applies to humans, or humanlike things. Language is said to 
be ‘[…] always changing as the circumstances and societies in which they are located change.’ 
(Collins 2010, pp. 30) Condition five differs from condition four as the change cannot be a fixed one, 
but a rather is a flexible ability. ‘Somehow, the ability that has to be transferred to engender fluent 
language use has to be flexible–it has to be an ability that can respond to social cues and contexts.’ 
(Collins 2010, pp. 31)  
Here Collins connects his epistemological theory, and the socialization problem with his arguments 
against the possibilities of AI, which he further elaborates by withholding that the difference between 
strings and language is a ’major principle’ because: ‘A language cannot be transformed. A language 
can only be translated, and translation always involves the risk of irremediable loss or change of 
meaning.’ (Collins 2010, pp. 25)  
Stings on the other hand are said to be possible to transform, and to transform back, without loss of 
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information. Collins holds that information in this context is a term that belongs to the physical world, 
and if any loss of information takes place in practice it can be more or less fixed with the help of 
techniques from the physical sciences. He presents three stages of which language translation, and 
plain conversation, within one natural language consists.   
(1) Inscription – ‘In “telling” the attempt is made to represent lived meaning with the inscribed 
string.’ (Collins 2010, pp. 27)  
(2) Transmission and transformation – ‘This is the move of the string from one person to another 
that always involves transformation of the string from one form to another.’ (Collins 2010, pp. 
28) Collins says that this is the domain of ordinary cause and effect.   
(3) Interpretation – ‘This is the attempt to recreate meaning from the string—to interpret it.’ 
(Collins 2010, pp. 28) 
The third is regard as unique to humans, or at least humanlike beings.19 Language is said to be full of 
meaning, whereas strings are defined as essentially meaningless, and Collins considers meaning to be 
something ‘that relates to the changing ways people live in society.’ (Collins 2010, pp. 26)  
It seems to me that Collins here is on a similar route as Searle. In the interpretation that Collins 
withhold as unique to humans the intentionality that Searle withhold appears to be essential. To create 
meaning (from the string) could be said to be one version of an intentional state (the feature by which 
the mental state is directed at or about).   
Collins believes that explicit knowledge can be transferred by the use of strings in the ‘right 
circumstances’, which are defined in five conditions for communication, and of these the first three are 
possible to explicate but condition four and five ‘comprise changes in the receiving entity rather than 
changes in the string.’ (Collins 2010, pp. 81) Four meanings of explicable is presented: 
(1) ‘Explicable by elaboration – A longer string affords meaning when a short 
one does not. 
(2) Explicable by transformation – Physical transformation of strings enhances 
their causal effect and affordance. 
(3) Explicable as mechanization – A string is transformed into mechanical causes 
and effects that mimic human action. 
(4) Explicable as explanation – Mechanical causes and affects are transformed 
into strings called scientific explanations.’ 
(Collins 2010, pp. 81) 
                                                      
19 Collins writes that it might be the case that dolphins, chimpanzees or some other animals have the interpretive abilities as 
humans to some degree. (Collins 2010, pp. 25) 
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Knowledge and the possibility of creating artificial intelligence  
Collins epistemological theory withholds aspects of knowledge basics, transfer and communication 
that are said to be unique and/or can only be performed by humans. Together with the problem of 
socialization they constitute Collins’ ‘unbreakable’ line between a human and what can be achieved 
by the AI-project. Lets shortly recapture these before continuing to Collins’ arguments for the need of 
a body/brain and tacit knowledge.  
When discussing strings Collins put forward that the level that only humans can master is the fourth; 
‘a string can communicate by being interpreted as meaningful by a human.’ This is related to the 
central place language plays in his theory. Of the conditions for communication presented it is the fifth 
condition; ‘the transfer of a string plus a significant flexible and responsive physical change in the 
entity gives rise to a communication‘ that is withheld as applicable to humans. The reason being that 
to be, or become, fluent in a language require a flexibility, and ability to respond to social cues and 
contexts, which, according to Collins, is something computers lack.  
One way to understand what Collins is aiming at here is to think about when you learn a new 
language. You might master the grammar, pronunciation, and have a large vocabulary, but when you 
visit a country were the language is the mother tongue you will notice that the way people speak 
differs in in different regions, and/or in cultural or social contexts, and a joke every native laughs at 
does not make any sense to you. There is in the translation of a language, as Collins states, always a 
risk of loss or change of meaning. Translation of a language, and plain conversation, takes place in 
three stages and it is the third, interpretation, that Collins hold to be unique to humans. Here again a 
connection is made to socialization as Collins states that language is full of meaning and is intertwined 
in the changing ways people live in society.  
 
The relation between the body, the world and knowledge 
In Artificial Experts Collins introduces the body and brain as vital ‘organs’ for a human’s ability to 
gain knowledge, and he differentiate between behaviour-specific acts and nonbehaviour-specific acts.  
The acts are similar in the way that they can be accomplished either self-consciously or unself-
consciously, but (some) nonbehaviour-specific acts are not possible to mimic (or make explicit). These 
are called ‘embodied’ and ‘embrained’ knowledge, and Collins thinks that what is special are that this 
knowledge cannot be taken out of the respective organs. Embodied/embrained knowledge differ from 
what Collins calls encoded knowledge, which is knowledge a human might do without thinking but 
one that can be ‘broken and its contents read’ (Collins 1990, pp. 219).  
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In Tacit and Explicit Knowledge the embodiment/embrained thesis is developed and the ‘minimal 
embodiment thesis’ and the ‘social embodiment thesis’ are introduced. The minimal embodiment 
thesis builds on the distinction between animals and humans, and Collins do not think that animals are 
able to be, or become, ‘social parasites’ and are only, and always, an individual thing. To be a ‘social 
parasite’, requires only a minimal (human) body, writes Collins, but the human brain is vital.  
The social embodiment thesis states that only humans have tacit knowledge, and this is a matter of the 
way human bodies are with ‘the kind of brain that is associated with the language speaking species 
and the larynx, lungs, and ears or prostheses that can take their place’ (Collins 2010, pp. 135). The 
collectivity’s language is said to only develop its characteristics as a result of the members of the 
collectivity practices. 
Collins also introduces the sociological uncertainty principle: ‘When a system is completely 
understood, it is too late for all practical purposes.’ Collins 1990, pp. 220) Preceding the principle is 
the assumption that a mistake is done when a scientific description of the world is taken to be the 
world itself. There is, says Collins, no problem with capturing what is stated in textbooks and insert 
them into a computer-program (expert system). The difficulty lays in trying to describe, and encode, 
the day-to-day practice of a scientist.  
‘Where the principle applies, only knowledge from low down the hierarchy is useful. This knowledge 
is not found in texts or computers but only in skilful people.’ (Collins 1990, pp. 220)  
 
Tacit knowledge  
In Tacit and Explicit Knowledge Collins presents a three Phase Model of tacit knowledge; relational 
tacit knowledge, RTK, somatic tacit knowledge, STK, and collective tacit knowledge, CTK. The 
presented definition of tacit knowledge is ‘[…] knowledge that is not explicated’ (Collins 2010, pp. 1).  
The first phase, relational tacit knowledge (weak tacit knowledge), RTK, is described as knowledge 
that could be made explicit by a physical transformation of strings (the second meaning of explicable). 
Collins thinks that the reason RTK is not made explicit turns on ‘the way societies are organized’, 
rather than depend on the nature and the location of knowledge or the way humans are constituted. In 
RTK both sender and receiver have enough cultural similarity from the beginning for a string to 
transfer the intended meaning if the string is proportionality the needed length. Collins believes that 
RTK, in principle, is possible to be made explicit.  
Somatic tacit knowledge (medium tacit knowledge), STK, has to do with ‘properties of individuals’ 
bodies and brains as physical things’ (Collins 2010, pp. 85–86). Collins holds that this is the kind of 
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tacit knowledge that humans have in common with animals and other living things, such as trees and 
plants. STK is possible to be made explicit by a string being ‘transformed into mechanical causes and 
effects that mimic human action (the third meaning of explicable). He holds that this transformation is 
an outcome of research done by scientists, and identifies two major subdivisions of somatic tacit 
knowledge; somatic-limit tacit knowledge and somatic-affordance tacit knowledge. The first is 
described as knowledge that is tacit because of our bodily limits. The later is knowledge that turns on 
the ‘special physical nature of the body (and brain)’. Both subdivisions can be made explicit by 
mechanical causes and affects are transformed into strings (the fourth meaning of explicable). 
Somatic-limit tacit knowledge can also be made explicit by the third meaning but this is not the case 
with somatic-affordance tacit knowledge, at least not yet but it might be possible in the future says 
Collins. This implies that at present somatic-affordance tacit knowledge only affects humans, since 
‘only the human body and brain are made of suitable substances’ (Collins 2010, pp. 113).  
 
Collective tacit knowledge (strong tacit knowledge), CTK 
Collective tacit knowledge, CTK, is of most interest in Collins arguments against AI, and has to do 
with ‘the way society is constituted’. According to Collins CTK we do not know how to make explicit, 
and we are not able to predict how to explicate CTK in any of the four senses of explicable. CTK is 
located in society, and Collins mentions social sensibility as a characteristic of a human in possession 
of CTK. Social sensibility is described as ability to adapt to different social and/or cultural setting, and 
to improvise in common situations in ordinary life. 
‘Bike riding in traffic, car driving in traffic, and dancing all require learning with a 
degree of flexibility so that the style can be changed to fit different circumstances, 
such as riding or driving in different countries and dancing in different settings.’  
(Collins 2010, pp. 123)  
The flexibility is said to be a matter of the fifth condition of communication; ‘The transfer of a string 
plus a significant flexible and responsive physical change in the entity gives rise to a communication’. 
Collins holds that CTK depends on specific features of humans, as is the case with somatic-affordance 
tacit knowledge, but it is not the individual that is the locus of knowledge but instead the collectivity, 
the individual shares the collectivity’s knowledge. ‘The special thing about humans is their ability to 
feast on the cultural blood of the collectivity in the way that fleas feast on the blood of large animals.’ 
(Collins 2010, pp. 131)  
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 Collins illustrative definition of humans is as parasites, and our uniqueness is that our brains ‘afford 
parasitism in the matter of socially located knowledge’. In Collins theory human bodies are not to be 
looked upon as boundaries for knowledge but instead the collective knowledge is seated in the 
collectivity of brains, which Collins states is ‘just a large- scale version of my brain’. Individual brains 
are described as connected to the neurons of every other brain in the way that the individual brain is in 
touch with through the five senses. ‘The collectivity of brains is just a large-scale version of my brain–
it is just a bigger collection of interconnected neurons–and, as with synapses, the weights of the 
connections change whenever social and technological life is rearranged’ (Collins 2010, pp. 132). 
Even if language is said to play an important role it is not withheld to alone be the most efficient. 
Collins also believes that physical activity is a step towards, and into the locations, where linguistic 
fluency is learned.  
While the other phases of tacit knowledge are held as possible to explicate CTK it is not that simple, 
and Collins believes that before a solution to the socialization problem, which can make explicable the 
way humans acquire CTK, is presented we are not able to explicate CTK, and thereby not able to 
develop an AI.   
‘We can describe the circumstances under which it is acquired, but we cannot 
describe or explain the mechanism nor build machines that can mimic it. Nor can 
we foresee how to build such machines in the way we can foresee how we might 
build machines to mimic somatic tacit knowledge.’  
(Collins 2010, pp. 138)  
 
Summary   
Collins arguments against the possibility of creating a general AI are interwoven with his 
epistemological claims. I will return to this in the conclusion but let me shortly relapse what parts that 
constitute the demarcation line before moving on to the status of today’s research in artificial 
intelligence. Collins believes that some sorts of tacit knowledge can be made explicit and by that, at 
least in theory, be adapted by machine/computer software. The tacit knowledge that cannot be made 
explicit is CTK, collective tacit knowledge. CTK is located in society, tacit knowledge that we have 
collectively and that changes with society and the use of language. A main point in Collins argument 
is that he makes a difference in the role of, what he calls, ‘the typical body’ and ‘the individual body’, 
and this is the focus in the minimal embodiment thesis. To be as social parasite, on the collectivity, 
only a minimal body is necessary but the human brain is vital, he writes, thereby putting the human 
brain in the central position for the connection, and communication in the collectivity. From Collins 
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point of view the difference between a human being and an artificial intelligence is ontological and it 
does not matter what e.g. Moors Law predict, thereby stated that it does not matter how powerful or 
advanced a computer chip or a software become, a computer will never be able to gain CTK. This is a 
different view than the ones Searle and Dreyfus propose. For Searle the hindrance for us to create an 
AI is not ontological but epistemological, we do not know what the biological constitution of 
consciousness is (yet), and since we do not have the epistemological facts at hand we cannot say that 
an AI is or is not possible. For Dreyfus the obstacle to overcome is to create computers of an entirely 
different sort, of a sort that have a model of a body similar to the human body with human experiences 
of ‘being a human’.   
29 
AI – the goals reached 2018 
In the following section focus is put on the two chosen segments of AI-research, autonomous vehicles 
and game-playing AIs. The two areas of research are chosen with their reported progress and Collins 
theory in mind. The area of autonomous vehicles are supposed and reported to in the near future be 
able to handle different types of environments, navigate in difficult weather, interpret conflicting 
signals and make ethical decisions, etc. with increased safety compared with a human driver. Game-
playing AI’s performance are at presented tested and used in a secluded game-environment but the 
research is of interest since these AIs are reported to be able to create their own set of rules and 
perform a basic communication. Both areas appears to challenge Collins critique of a potential general 
AI by exhibiting social sensibility, being able to adapt to different social and/or cultural setting and 
improvise when needed plus developing a (limited) language in order to communicate.  
 
Autonomous vehicles  
The benefits of autonomous vehicles are anticipated to be several, impacting traffic safety, equity, the 
environment and economy, e.g. quoting Tesla’s and Volvo’s websites: 
‘All Tesla vehicles produced in our factory, including Model 3, have the hardware 
needed for full self-driving capability at a safety level substantially greater than 
that of a human driver.’  
(Tesla 2018)  
‘We believe that mobility should be safer, sustainable and more convenient. For 
Volvo Cars, technology should make people’s lives easier. That’s why our 
approach to autonomous driving is all about the people that will use them.’  
(Volvo Car Corporation 2018) 
Tesla has already the autopilot-function installed in several models, and Volvo is currently running 
their Drive Me project in Gothenburg, Sweden. (Volvo Car Corporation 2018) The project is said to 
be a pre-step in Volvo’s development of safe autonomous driving. Volvo is not unique in tackling the 
test-process by letting the public try out their technology, e.g. a similar project is the Ann Arbor 
Connected Vehicle Test Environment’, AACVTE (Ann Arbor Connected Vehicle Test Environment 
2018) initiated by University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute.  
When talking about autonomous vehicles it should be remembered that automatic processes have been 
common in the car industry for several years. A table of layers of autonomy can be of use for 
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discriminating at what level of automation the industry is today, and which goal(s) that are aimed at. 
SAE International defines in standard J3016: Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to On-
Road Motor Vehicle Automated Driving Systems, six levels (0 – 5) of driving automation (SAE 
International 2014). 
Level 0: No Automation – all major systems are controlled by the human driver.  
Level 1: Driver Assistance – certain systems, e.g. cruise control and automatic braking, may be 
controlled by a driver assistance system but the human driver monitor the driving environment and all 
other parts of driving. 
Level 2: Partial Automation – the driver assistance system can execute both steering and 
acceleration/deceleration, but it requires the human driver for safe operation.   
Level 3: Conditional Automation – the automated driving system can execute all aspects of driving, 
but the human driver is expected to respond appropriately to a request to intervene. 
Level 4: High Automation – the automated driving system handles all aspects of driving in some 
scenarios, but not all.  
Level 5 – Full Automation – the automated driving system handles all aspects of driving in every 
situation that can be managed by a human driver. 
In level 0–2 the human driver monitor the driving environment, but in level 3–5 the automated driving 
system monitor the driving environment in different degrees. Autonomous vehicles today are at level 
three, and slowly crossing over to level four, which is expected to happen in the next couple of years. 
(Union of Concerned Scientists 2018) 
Different brands of autonomous vehicles are more or less using the same technology, although the 
field of research is done with different approaches; car manufactures combining hardware 
development with software development, universities combining software development with 
prototype-vehicle building, companies specializing in software, etc. For example Tesla uses a neural 
net program that processes vision, sonar and radar using cameras, radar and ultrasonics (ultrasound) to 
navigate. A sensor that Tesla does not say they use but that also is frequently used is LIDAR, Light 
Detection and Ranging (or Light Imaging, Detection, And Ranging), which is an instrument 
principally consisting of a laser, a scanner and a specialized GPS receiver. The sensors are used to 
mimic what a human driver can see.  
Some companies, e.g. Mcity, University of Michigan, and Volvo are working with technology that add 
interaction and/or communication making the software ‘better’ than a human driver. Mcity is testing 
V2V, vehicle-to-vehicle, communication that is wireless and make it possible for vehicles to share 
data, e.g. location, speed and direction. To make the communication technology working optimally it 
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is also installed in infrastructure, vehicle-to-infrastructure, e.g. traffic lights. The technology is 
expected to allow cars ‘[…] to see beyond what is immediately in front of them – sensing a red light 
around a blind curve, or automatically braking for a car that runs a stop sign.’ (Fingas 2017)  
‘In a typical driverless vehicle prototype, cameras, lidar and radar devices serve as "eyes." But these 
sensors can't detect obstacles beyond their line of sight–like the stopped car behind the blind curve, for 
example. Connected technology changes that.’ (Moore 2017) 
 
AIs who plays games 
To begin with two central terms needs to be described, game tree and the minimax algorithm.  
A game tree is a representation of the positions in the game, the game states, presented as nodes in the 
tree and possible actions as edges. The tree starts at the root, which represents the state at the 
beginning of the game, followed by the first level representing the possible states after the first move, 
followed by the second level representing the possible states after the second move, etc. Monte Carlo 
Tree Search (MCTS) focuses its analysis on the most promising moves by running many game 
simulations.  
‘At first, the simulations are completely random: actions are chosen randomly at 
each state, for both players. At each simulation, some values are stored, such as 
how often each node has been visited, and how often this has led to a win. These 
numbers guide the later simulations in selecting actions (simulations thus become 
less and less random). The more simulations are executed, the more accurate these 
numbers become at selecting winning moves. It can be shown that as the number 
of simulations grows, MCTS indeed converges to optimal play.’  
(Burger 2016)  
The minimax algorithm states that at ‘each game turn, the AI figures out which move would minimize 
the worst-case scenario’ (Burger 2016). The algorithm is useful when, and requires that, the complete 
game-tree is known.   
 
Go, Ms. Pacman, Gathering game, and Wolfpack hunting game 
For a very long time the game Go was considered to be a game not possible for a computer to conquer, 
the background being the complexity of the game and the amount of possible moves. ‘There’s limited 
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data available just from looking at the board, and choosing a good move demands a great deal of 
intuition.’ (Byford 2016) 
In March 2016 Google’s AlphaGo, a version of DeepMind, beat Lee Se-dol, the second-highest 
ranking professional Go player in a match of five games of which AlphaGo won four. In Go there are 
more possible moves than in chess at each state, a wider branching factor, making it more difficult to 
search the game tree for a sufficient depth, and it has turned out to be more difficult to design 
evaluation factors for Go. The approach therefore had to be another than with Chess where the 
program searched the game tree as far as possible, usually to a depth of six moves or more, and after 
this an evaluation evaluated the quality of the nodes at that depth. The evaluation function then 
replaced the subtree below that node with a single value summarizing this subtree after which it 
proceeded in a similar way as the minimax algorithm and adopted the move that led to the least bad 
worst-case scenario.  
AlphaGo consists of two different components, a tree search procedure and convolutional networks (a 
special type of neural networks). The convolutional networks ‘guide’ the tree search procedure, and 
they are learned. A total of three networks were trained; two policy networks and one value network, 
all using the current game state as input.  
‘The value network provides an estimate of the value of the current state of the 
game […]. The input to the value network is the whole game board, and the output 
is a single number, representing the probability of a win. The policy networks 
provide guidance regarding which action to choose, given the current state of the 
game. The output is a probability value for each possible legal move (i.e. the output 
of the network is as large as the board). Actions (moves) with higher probability 
values correspond to actions that have a higher chance of leading to a win.’  
(Burger 2016) 
First the policy networks was trained on positions from games played by human experts, then in order 
for the program to be able to win, and not only predict moves from its opponent, the networks played 
against each other. The outcome of the played games was used as a training signal (deep 
reinforcement learning).  The value network was also trained on, 30 million, game positions, and the 
final result of the training is described as special: ‘[…] it suggests a mixture of intuition and reflection. 
The value network provides the intuition, whereas the simulation result provides the reflection.’ 
‘AlphaGo uses a mixture of the output of the value network and the result of a self-play simulation of 
the fast policy network: value of a state = value network output + simulation result.’ (Burger 2016) 
The classic arcade-game Ms. Pacman, by Atari, was one of the latest hindrances for game-playing AIs 
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to overcome. By the beginning of June 2017 Microsoft/Maluuba’s AI20 scored the ultimate top-score, 
999 990 points. In Ms. Pacman the goal is to obtain points by eating pellets and at the same time avoid 
being submerged and killed by ghosts. If the player eat one of the special power pellets the ghost turn 
blue for a short time, and the ghosts can then be eaten, which award the player with extra points. At 
each level of the game there are bonus fruits that can be eaten for extra points. To get to a new level all 
the pellets has to be eaten. The win is described as unique due to the way the AI works. Linn quotes 
one of the research managers, Harm van Seijen, ‘[…] the best results were achieved when each agent 
acted very egotistically – for example, focused only on the best way to get to its pellet – while the top 
agent decided how to use the information from each agent to make the best move for everyone.’ (Linn 
2017) The programming-architecture used approximately 160 different agents, each focused on one 
specific task, and each working in parallel with other agents. In this way the overall task of mastering 
Ms. Pacman was divided into small pieces. On ‘top’ a central agent, ‘oracle’, controlled the 
movements of Ms. Pacman, and this agent’s task was to decide how to use the information from each 
subagent in order to make the best (safest and most rewarding) move for Ms. Pacman, which was done 
by assigning each object, a pellet, a ghost or a fruit, a fixed weight, where the pellets and the fruit were 
given positive weight and the ghosts negative weight. ‘There’s this nice interplay between how they 
have to, on the one hand, cooperate based on the preferences of all the agents, but at the same time 
each agent cares only about one particular problem, […]. It benefits the whole.’ (van Seijen as cited by 
Linn 2017) 
The Maluuba AI uses Hybrid Reward Architecture, HRA, which takes as input a decomposed reward 
function and learns a separate value function for each component reward function. Because each 
component typically only depends on a subset of all features, the overall value function is described as 
smoother and easier to approximate by a low-dimensional representation, which enables effective 
learning. (van Seijen et. al 2017).  
Google’s AI, DeepMind, has been used in several other game playing and learning sessions. During 
the beginning of 2017 researches put DeepMind to test with a fruit Gathering game and a Wolfpack 
hunting game. The goal of the test was to investigate DeepMind’s willingness to cooperate with 
others. Both games have a level of cooperation and the outcome of the game depends on the player’s 
willingness to either act alone or to cooperate. The researchers describe their choice of games and 
outset as follows; ‘We introduce sequential social dilemmas that share the mixed incentive structure of 
matrix game social dilemmas but also require agents to learn policies that implement their strategic 
intentions.’ (Leibo, Zambaldi, Lanctot, Marecki & Graepel 2017, pp. 1) 
In both games two AI agents were asked to compete against each other. In the Gathering game the 
                                                      
20 Maluuba is Montreal-based company acquired by Microsoft in the beginning of 2017.  
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agents should try to gather as many apples as possible. The outcome was that everything went 
smoothly as long as enough apples were around, but when the supply of apples became sparse the 
agents turned aggressive, using laser beams to knock (tag) the other out of the game for a set period. 
No extra points, or rewards, were given when an agent knocked the other over, nothing more than the 
remaining one bought itself time to gather apples without inference.  
In the Wolfpack hunting game the goal was to catch a prey (a third player). Reward was given when 
the prey was captured. If more than one wolf caught the prey reward was proportionately given to all 
wolfs in the capture radius. The prey was seen as dangerous, a lone wolf catching the prey was at risk 
losing the carcass to scavengers, and players working together had a better chance of protecting it, and 
get a higher reward. Different to in the Gathering game the agents opted for collaboration, either one 
agent found the other and together started the hunt of the prey, or one agent found the prey first and 
waited until the other agent arrived before starting the hunt.  
The researches also noted a difference between less complex iterations of DeepMind and more 
complex forms. The more complex the agent was the more prone it was to use violence in the 
Gathering game and opt for cooperation in the Wolfpack game. (Science Alerts 2017) The behaviours 
of the agents are described as humanlike in an interview with one of the team researchers, Joel Z 
Leibo. 
‘This model also shows that some aspects of human-like behaviour emerge as a 
product of the environment and learning. Creating AI agents that co-operate with 





AI today, and in the expected future, and Harry 
Collins’ demarcation line between humans and AIs 
Collins’ arguments against the possibility of creating an AI follow a red tread of tacit knowledge and 
socialization. In Artificial Experts the un-crossable line between human and AI was drawn more or 
less between explicit and tacit knowledge. In Tacit and Explicit Knowledge Collins redefines his 
arguments and the line is placed ‘in’ tacit knowledge between motoric tacit knowledge, MTK, and 
collective tacit knowledge, CTK. He does seem to make a reservation that he does not think it in any 
foreseeable future will be possible to make CTK explicit and accordingly for a machine/computer to 
gain the ability of CTK. (Collins 2010, pp. 138) 
Let me begin with the current state of AI-research and put it in relation to Collins’ thoughts, before 
moving on to Collins’ epistemological theory and the possible weaknesses I have noted in it, and 
finally closing by connecting with his critique of the possibilities of AI by, in parts, reviving the 
epistemological chicken debate. By the end of this section it should become evident if Collins’ 
arguments stand the test of todays AI-innovations, and if not which consequences the possible flaws in 
his arguments have for his epistemological theory. 
 
Socialness and AI  
The minimal embodiment thesis is Collins’ safeguard against a general AI. Even if we are able to 
make CTK explicit and transfer it to software the AI will not be able to fulfil the minimal embodiment 
thesis. If the minimal embodiment thesis is not to be taken literal, for example by saying that a brain 
does not have to consist of the same ‘material’ as a human brain does, but harbour the same functions 
and abilities, then the point of departure for the AI-project is brighter21.  
The social embodiment thesis, stating that only an entity with the human kind of brain, one that is 
associated with the language speaking species, has the ability to become social parasites, blocks off 
the AI project almost as definite. But here a loophole might be available, and that is because of the 
focus put on language speaking species. If we create a species that is able to speak a language, as a 
human, and having the flexibility in its adaptation to different social and cultural settings, CTK, then 
we in theory could be able to create an AI. But this requires that we skip the minimal embodiment 
thesis or at least does not read it literally to need a human brain.  
                                                      
21 This assumption would place Collins very close to the theory proposed by Searle that if we solve the problem of how 
consciousness comes about, then we in principle would be able to create an AI.  
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With this said only the minimal embodiment thesis can be read as the demarcation line between a 
human brain and an AI. The minimal embodiment thesis does have implications for Collins 
epistemological thesis though, which I will return to shortly. Of importance here is that the social 
embodiment thesis appears to be able to ‘overrule’ given that we are able to make CTK explicit. For 
Collins both thesis are important since they together, as well as the connection between them, 
safeguard against the threat of moving goalposts where the success of the AI-research e.g. is said to 
have reached the goal of a general AI just because the AI is able to mimic certain aspects of tacit 
knowledge. At the same time Collins makes sure that human intelligence is not ‘just’ the matter of 
ability, CTK, and neither a part of the human body but a complex relation between the physical pre-
condition(s) and something that according to him cannot be rationalised.    
If we overlook the minimal embodiment thesis anyway and take a closer look at the next obstacle, 
socialness: How close are AI-researchers to crack that code? Lets start by recapturing Collins thoughts 
about strings. Collins holds that it is in the fourth way strings are able to affect entities, ‘a string can 
communicate by being interpreted as meaningful by a human’, that is resided for humans. He declare 
that computers are said to primarily occupy the third way, ‘a string can communicate “mechanically,” 
as when a new piece of code is fed into a computer or a human reacts to a sound in a reflex-like way’ 
(Collins 2010 pp. 16–17), but that computers often are mistaken to be able to occupy the fourth way as 
well.  
In both the third and fourth way communication is vital, which leads to the assumption that Collins 
thinks that computers in some aspect are able to communicate. Although not in the same ways as 
humans due to them not being able to fulfil his five conditions for communication, and especially not 
the fifth condition; ‘The transfer of a string plus a significant flexible and responsive physical change 
in the entity gives rise to a communication’. The fifth condition has as pre-condition a fluency in 
(human) language, which is described as always changing in relation to changes in society. The 
fluctuating nature of language therefore defines condition five as a flexible ability not possible to be 
fixed, which is another important section of Collins’ argument against the possibility of AI, because 
the only ways for condition five to take place is through socialization.  
With addition of the three stages language is translated Collins ads further weight to his arguments, 
stating that he does not believe the third stage of translation, ‘the attempt to recreate meaning from the 
string—to interpret it’, is reachable for a computer since they ‘only’ deal with transformation of 
strings, and strings are said to be ‘just a physical thing’ whereas language is believed to be full of 
meaning. What computers are able to do though are to mechanical mimic acts that humans perform 
self-consciously as well as unself-consciously.  
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An example of a situation where Collins thinks the flexibility of the knowledge, his fifth condition of 
communication, is vital is when a car-driver navigates in traffic. This ability is of fundamental 
importance to the AI-field of autonomous vehicles. Today vehicles are said to nudge at level four of 
automation and are anticipated to sometime in the near future reach level five, full automation. If 
autonomous vehicles reach level five, and if the vehicles are able to communicate with the 
infrastructure, including pedestrians, cyclists, etc. in a sufficient way then this could mean that they 
are able to fulfil Collins’ fifth condition of communication. Then it can be argued that the autonomous 
vehicles in their limited world could achieve a level of socialness between each other, interchanging 
information and being affected by their ‘society’, even if it is not a human way of interaction. They 
would then be social parasites in a autonomous vehicles’ world, using a signal-based language that 
might be possible to translate into human language. Would this do for a general AI? Well I would say 
no, due to the responses from the car not being self-learning neither possible to act flexible more than 
under very strict rules. These limitations of the autonomous vehicle will be placed on them by the 
developers, and regulated by laws, all to make sure the vehicles are safe for humans. If the strict 
control, laws and regulations of the industry are overlooked it could be imagined that the vehicles 
started to use their communication skills to help each other, tipping each other where the police 
controls are so that the car ‘behaves’ appropriate, taking shortcuts on pedestrian streets and in other 
ways breaking rules when estimated safe, and they had something to win (as human car drivers do 
today). But hopefully we will never meet an anarchistic self-driving car deciding to break the rules and 
do a burnout just for the fun of it on the freeway. So if the regulations and traffic rules are correctly, 
and without bugs, implemented in the algorithm, and the vehicles self-learning abilities are set to a 
minimum, and very limited, then an autonomous vehicle is not threatening Collins argument even it 
might be able to act as if it is. 
DeepMinds game-playing AIs’ learning in the Gathering and the Wolfpack games appears to be 
shifting some ground as well. What has happened, if only at a very modest level, is that the AIs’ 
approach and solutions create rules of their own and act in ways that can be perceived as humanlike. 
The language part is here lacking in an articulated form, but in the Wolfpack game the agents 
performed a basic communication when deciding to hunt as a team, a behaviour that the AI-agents had 
learned via trial and error. The important aspect is that the AI-agents learned, they were not instructed 
to behave in a collaborative, or non-collaborative way.  
Collins considers meaning in the context of language to be something ‘that relates to the changing 
ways people live in society’, and it can be argued that at a very basic level this is what the AI-agents in 
these games do when they react to increase and decrease in assets, apples or points given when not 
losing the prey to scavengers.   
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Changes in society, adaption and AI  
Collins hold changes in society e.g. use of language, cultural differences, etc. to be an obstacle that an 
AI will not be able to handle. With autonomous vehicles the example with vehicles navigating in 
different traffic-scenarios probably will be solved and accordingly his example will loose its 
correctness. The industry is not fully there yet though, and even if the industry beam out how close 
they are to level five of automation they still have to completely master level four, and obstacles might 
occur along the way.22 DeepMind has proved to be able to adapt to the (game-)environment and to 
change behaviour, without any set rules of how to, by it self, and its actions has been described as 
humanlike, and to have emerged as ‘[…] a product of the environment and learning’ (Leibo 2017 as 
cited by Burgess 2017). 
During the summer of 2017 the media reported of Facebook deciding to close down one of their AI 
projects after two AI-programs appeared to talk to each other in a self-constructed language.23 
Facebook’s project is one of several working in the area of language and AIs. At OpenAI another 
project has been conducted, and these AIs are encouraged to find ways of communicating in order to 
improve their skills.  
‘Our hypothesis is that true language understanding will come from agents that 
learn words in combination with how they affect the world, rather than spotting 
patterns in a huge corpus of text. As a first step, we wanted to see if cooperative 
agents could develop a simple language amongst themselves.’ 
(Abbeel, Mordatch, Lowe, Gauthier & Clark 2017) 
The way the work is conducted is that it aims for the AIs to invent a simple language, which is 
grounded and compositional. With ‘grounded’ meaning that the words are tied to something ‘directly 
experienced by a speaker in their environment’, and compositional meaning that the speakers ’can 
assemble multiple words into a sentence to represent a specific idea’ (Abbeel, Mordatch, Lowe, 
Gautier & Clark 2017).   
To train the AI’s multi-agent reinforcement learning problems are used and the experiments are 
represented as cooperative rather than competitive. OpenAI’s project is interesting especially with 
Collins’ hesitation regarding the possibility of AIs and socialization in mind, but the language-projects 
still have to post more reports of progress before they can be taken into account.  
                                                      
22 Volvo has for example noted that Volvo’s autonomous cars have problems with kangaroos. (Zhou 2017)  
23 What happened in short was that the programs had been given the task of negotiating between themselves and to improve 
their bartering. During this learning process the AIs developed a shorthand language that was not readable for others than the 
chat-bots. (Griffin 2017)  
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Changes in society require the flexibility that Collins includes in CTK and the examples above can be 
interpreted as having at least a start of CTK. In Tacit and Explicit Knowledge he present an example 
‘Badly broken text that is and isn’t easily repaired’, and writes that there are three remarkable things 
with humans being able to ‘repair’ the broken text and understand what it says.  
‘The first remarkable thing is that most readers can read the second passage so 
easily and the overall demonstration shows that the reading is accomplished via 
meaning. The second, still more remarkable thing is that, though my spell- checker 
highlighted almost every word with a jagged redline indicating a mistake, the copy 
editor of this book will not even think about correcting either paragraph. That is an 
effect of understanding meaning at a still higher level—the meaning of a whole 
group of paragraphs. The third remarkable thing is that you, dear reader, have 
actually undertaken to try to repair both passages, known when it was time to give 
up in the case of the first passage, and known that you should persevere in the case 
of the second passage in spite of any initial difficulty.’ 
(Collins 2010, pp. 115–116) 
Collins argues that humans have the ability to do all three things but things around us cannot do this 
kind in respect of us. With computers, pocket calculators, etc. he writes that these are ‘social 
prostheses’, meaning ‘entities that can take the place of a social being because the rest of the social 
organism fills in the gaps’ (Collins 2010, pp. 116).   
This brings to mind NEIL, Never Ending Image Learner. NEILs work is to automatically extract 
visual knowledge from Internet data, and the effort is to ‘It is an attempt to develop the world’s largest 
visual structured knowledge base with minimum human labelling effort.’(Chen, Shrivastava & Gupta 
2013) It is possible to image a similar database with words, which would be able to provide an 
unsupervised AI with a basic knowledge similar to that humans learn during childhood. The AI would 
have to keep the knowledge up-to-date and flexible by interacting with its environment. This could be 
looked upon as a brute force way of knowledge since the AI would have all the world’s interpretations 
of a single word available, and it would probably use enormous amounts of processing power. But if 
the brute-force-argument is put to a side then the relation between the AI, and the word-knowledge-
database has a similar relation as the asymmetry-relation between a human and the things around us 
that Collins holds is de facto.  
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Reviving the epistemological chicken debate and the 
implications of the current state of AI on Collins’ 
epistemological theory 
During the epistemological chicken debate Bruno Latour and Michel Callon described Collins’ and 
Steve Yearley’s claim to one of a tug-of-war between natural realism and social realism, and that 
scientists should alternate to social realism when they play the role of sociologists explaining science 
from natural realism when they are scientists (Latour & Callon 1992, in Pickering, pp. 346). Collins 
and Yearley confirm this in their reply when they provide their ‘prescription’ in the world of 
philosophical insecure objects namely to ‘stand on social things–be social realists–in order to explain 
natural things’ (Collin & Yearley 1992, in Pickering, pp. 382).   
According to Latour and Callon Collins and Yearley think that any ‘sociologist who stops being a 
social realist would be a traitor, since he or she would abandon the fight, or worse still, help out the 
other side’ (Latour & Callon 1992, in Pickering, pp. 346). Latour and Callon hold that they are viewed 
as traitors of this kind because they ‘give back to nature the role of settling controversies.’ (Latour & 
Callon 1992, in Pickering, pp. 346)  
To be able to refute the possibility of creating a general AI Collins places the minimal embodiment 
thesis and the social embodiment thesis as the demarcation line between the human body/brain and the 
potential artificial intelligence. The thesis’ constitute the line that no computer program will be able to 
cross and therefore is a general AI not possible. It is not an option, as I have showed earlier, to skip the 
embodiment thesis, if we do the theory starts to weaken and the demarcation line Collins want to draw 
between humans and AIs cannot be firmly placed.  
With his definition of the thesis’ Collins seems to commit the same ‘treason’ of which he accused 
Latour and Callon of committing, namely of bringing natural realism into the sociological realm (of 
knowledge). The reason being that the minimal embodiment thesis presupposes that (human) 
knowledge starts in human biology, in the physical constitution of a human. Whether it is only the 
human brain or to what extent other parts of the human body are prerequisite is left open. Also the 
social embodiment thesis holds a pre-requirement of the human biological setting, the need of a 
minimal human body. The implication is hereby that Collins is taking a naturalistic point of departure, 
before continuing his line of arguments by distancing himself from any, and all, naturalistic 
explanations by trying to make sure that all arguments are socially anchored.  
When the two thesis’ are placed in the context of Collins’ epistemological theory it is difficult to 
overlook this ‘slip’ towards naturalism. The ‘slip’ consisting in the founding of knowledge in physical 
pre-deposition of the human body and brain rather than, as Collins empathizes in social interactions 
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and the collectivity. With the minimal embodiment thesis, but also the social embodiment thesis, 
Collins shift his position by taking a step a closer to natural realism, which make him dependent on the 
natural sciences if his demarcation line between a human brain and a AI shall stand solid. In the 
context of Collins epistemological theory this implies that human knowledge is founded in, and can be 
explained by, natural science.  
This is not the only part that appears unstable in Collins thesis’, and which brings the epistemological 
chicken debate to mind. If we hold that AIs are able to produce, contribute, or even create knowledge, 
as can be alluded with the quote from the Go-community below, then it seems as if AIs are more than 
mere things, and that the dichotomy that Collins hesitate between people and things (Collins & 
Yearley 1992, pp. 386) is not solid.  
‘But AlphaGo could also open up new avenues for the game. Members of the Go 
community are as stunned with the inventive, aggressive way AlphaGo won as the 
fact that it did at all. "There were some moves at the beginning – what would you 
say about those three moves on the right on the fifth line?" American Go 
Association president Andy Okun asked VP of operations Andrew Jackson, who 
also happens to be a Google software engineer, at the venue following the match. 
"As it pushes from behind?" Jackson replied. "If I made those same moves…" 
Okun continued. "Our teachers would slap our wrists," Jackson agreed. "They’d 
smack me!" says Okun. "You don’t push from behind on the fifth line!" "We’re 
absolutely in shock," said Jackson. 
"There’s a real question, though. We’ve got this established Go orthodoxy, so 
what’s this going to reveal to us next? Is it going to shake things up? Are we going 
to find these things that we thought were true – these things you think you know 
and they just ain’t so?" ‘  
(Byford 2016) 
Collins holds that things may contribute to our social experience, but that the things are not able to 
absorb anything equivalent to my social experience. (Collins 2010, pp. 117) With autonomous 
vehicles this is happening, at present in portions since the vehicles still have the possibility for the 
human driver to interfere. Quoting Tesla’s web-page on the feature ‘Full Self-Driving Capability’ that 
today can be ordered on a new Tesla;  
‘[…] enabling full self-driving in almost all circumstances, at what we believe 
will be a probability of safety at least twice as good as the average human 
driver. The system is designed to be able to conduct short and long distance 
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trips with no action required by the person in the driver’s seat. […] All you 
will need to do is get in and tell your car where to go. If you don’t say 
anything, the car will look at your calendar and take you there as the assumed 
destination or just home if nothing is on the calendar. Your Tesla will figure 
out the optimal route, navigate urban streets (even without lane markings), 
manage complex intersections with traffic lights, stop signs and roundabouts, 
and handle densely packed freeways with cars moving at high speed. When 
you arrive at your destination, simply step out at the entrance and your car 
will enter park seek mode, automatically search for a spot and park itself.’  
(Tesla 2018)  
For the car to be able to perform in ‘Full Self-Driving Capability’ it have to able to absorb the 
surroundings, adapt to traffic rules as well as other drivers mistakes and navigate different 
environments (from snow to traffic jams). The ‘Full Self-Driving Capability’ also has capabilities that 
are similar to a digital personal assistant as it is able to ‘read’ your (digital) calendar and act from what 
is written in it.  
In a recent report from the DeepMind team the researchers present that they have been able to develop 
an AI that have capabilities which resembles the navigational abilities of a human, and that in the 
future could be used in autonomous vehicles. The AI has at present only been tested in maze-
environment, but the researches write that their findings are ‘providing a foundation for proficient 
navigation’ (Banino, Barry & Kumaran 2018).  
The autonomous vehicles driving on the streets today do not talk to each other, and they will most 
likely not ‘talk’ to each other in any human language, but their communication will be possible to 
translate into a human language. The cars will probably not be able to interact in an epistemological 
discussion, or write a paper on a subject, but they will be able to communicate between themselves, 
and the infrastructure. This communication will be of meaning to them to the extent of their task.  
With DeepMind and the results from the Gathering and Wolfpack game the case of learning and 
knowledge is slightly different. DeepMind agents are not provided with a set of rules but instead they 
‘[…] learn for themselves to achieve successful strategies that lead to the greatest long-term rewards. 
[…] Also like a human, our agents construct and learn their own knowledge directly from raw inputs, 
such as vision, without any hand-engineered features or domain heuristics.’ (Silver 2016) 
Even if we grant that Collins is correct in his thought that ‘things’ ‘do not participate in the world of 
language in the way that humans participate; they participate only in the world’ (Collins 2010, pp. 
117), and regard AIs as things, they will most likely impact not only the way we humans experience 
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society but also our knowledge of the world, ourselves and knowledge as such. Collins fundamental 
thesis that knowledge rests in society, the crucial role of socialisation and how experts come to shape 
then weakens. If (human) society invites the ‘knowledge’ produced, and even created, by AIs and 
adapts it into the human way of for example playing a game is it then ‘knowledge’ created by the 
human as s/he interprets the output created by the AI? Or is it knowledge created by the AI? If the 
answer is that the AI is granted a contributional status, then there are resemblances to the thoughts 
presented by Actor Network Theory where things play a participating role in the construction of 












The stake I set out with this paper was to investigate and clarify if, and how, the demarcation line that 
Collins drew between human and AI has been moved or maybe even disappeared. The questions asked 
were whether Collins arguments still are valid and, if not, if his epistemological thesis has been 
affected. The focus has, in line with Collins arguments, been put on the cannot argument stating that a 
general AI cannot be developed, and this is why it can be empirically tested since Collins hold that an 
AI will not be able to absorb anything equivalent to human social experience.   
To say that an AI will substitute a human being in the future might seem daring. If Collins is right, and 
if by principle the human level/general/strong AI cannot be constructed, then there is also no cause for 
concern, or to take any precautions against the replacement of humans by machines, or to (re)direct 
research in a direction that will safeguard against unfortunate events more than from a functional 
perspective. 
Collins critique against the possibility of a general AI is well formulated and founded in his 
epistemological theory, and on the surface it appears solid, but there are fatal weaknesses. Collins 
needs to safeguard against the threat of moving goalposts if he is to withhold his ontological stand. He 
does this by introducing the minimal embodiment thesis, together with the social embodiment thesis. 
With these thesis’ it will never ever be possible to create a humanlike artificial intelligence, no matter 
how efficient and advanced any computer or software ever become.  
When Collins clutches to the minimal embodiment thesis he takes a step away from social 
constructivism, upon which his epistemological theory rests, and says that the human uniqueness is 
founded in the physical constitution of the human body (and brain). He hereby moves his 
epistemological point of departure from social constructivism to(wards) naturalism. The reason being 
that Collins holds that for both the thesis’ a human body, at least a human brain, is required. Without 
the physical pre-requirement tacit knowledge, which only humans have (CTK at least) is not possible, 
and tacit knowledge is the foundation for socialization and all epistemological claims that Collins 
make in his theory.  
It appears clear to me that with the minimal embodiment thesis Collins assumes that human 
knowledge starts in the physical constitution of the human body and brain. Without the ‘flesh and 
blood’, to some extent, the knowledge that Collins hold to be uniquely human will never be possible to 
(re)construct. With socialization, withheld by Collins as an essential part in his argument against AI, 
two aspects needs to be settled for the socialization problem to be solved. The first focusing on how 
humans approach and handle questions and answers, where Collins thinks that humans unfold context, 
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and in doing so need to be sensitive to what is going on around them which it is handled by e.g. asking 
and replying to questions. In a rudimentary way that is the same as what digital personal assistants do, 
and a more advanced example is OpenAI‘s approach to learning (a) language. Both use questions and 
answers in order to function well and be of use. The difference being that the AIs do not by 
themselves define the objective and what is of use and non-use, this is done by the human researchers. 
Facebook’s AIs, which are supposed to have started to invent their own language (‘shorthand’) in 
order to be better at their task seems to be different. But even though it appears as if the chat bots did 
invent something on their own they were designed to do a task, and that is what they did, but since 
they were not programmed to communicate in English they didn’t. (Simonite 2017)  
The second aspect put focus on ‘the right way to do things’, and Collins think that this is only possible 
to capture through experience, which is something that can vary from country to country and/or 
cultural contexts. Similar to with the first aspect I hesitate that this is not different to what takes place 
in certain AI-applications e.g. the development of autonomous cars as well as in the above-mentioned 
examples with digital personal assistants and OpenAI.  
Collins think that language is a vital part of socialization and hesitate that what humans can, and an AI 
cannot, is to interpret meaning within a natural language. Unlike Collins it seems to me that what 
artificial intelligence software and applications do, on a very basic level, is similar; they interpret, and 
translate, something said into some form of action.  
Collins believe that physical activity is an important part in acquiring linguistic fluency, and learning 
‘the right way to do things’, and it is only through socialization that his fifth condition for 
communication can take place; ‘The transfer of a string plus a significant flexible and responsive 
physical change in the entity gives rise to a communication’. It is defined as a flexible ability not 
possible to be fixed, and has fluency in language as its pre-condition, something that always is 
changing in relation to changes in society. With the discussed examples of AIs together with the 
different ways of learning that is used in training AIs it appears to me as if the AIs are socialized into 
the environment in which they act, but they do not act on their own objective, or if they are interpreted 
as doing so it is in a very limited environment (as with the Wolfpack and Gathering game).  
AIs in 2018 are not general AIs. Some tasks that the AIs do are better and more accurate done by them 
than by a human, but these are tasks performed in a closed environment, e.g. a virus program aiming 
at detecting potential data breach. In these enclosed specific areas, with its limited tasks, the AI is 
more of an ‘expert’ than a human trying to do the same work.  
I do not find Collins demarcation line, or critique solid enough, and it does have implications for his 
epistemological theory. If Collins demarcation line is resting on the minimal body thesis then this is a 
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naturalistic foundation, a foundation in the physical constitution of the human brain and body. Human 
knowledge is then founded in how the cells, neurons, blood vessels, soft tissue, etc. is put together and 
functions, and social constructionism can be described and defined by the natural sciences. If 
knowledge is gained, defined and constructed through socialization as Collins withhold, then the 
physical body and brain are not but ‘mere’ matter of physical material that, although from what we 
know, works as merely a possible constitution for knowledge and not necessarily the only one(s).    
If I return to the quoted reflection regarding Go and the AlphaGo’s way of playing when it won. What 
happens after the match is that human Go-players are able to reflect and discuss the development of 
each game, and to put them in a social context. If AlphaGo had lost it also would have learned from 
it’s mistakes but what the Go community reflect upon, is that AlphaGo actually breaks the ‘social 
codex’ of the game. AlphaGo does not break the rules of Go but what is socially accepted as an 
elegant way to play the game. This is from my point of view a creative solution, and method that 
AlphaGo uses, one where it finds a loophole that human Go-players have been ‘taught to ignore’ 
through their socialization into being a GO-player.  
The creative way used by AlphaGo resemble Wittgensteins example with a pupil who is presented 
with the task of continuing a series of numbers. The pupil does not continue the series of numbers as 
the teacher ‘meant’, instead the pupil continue as s/he thinks is correct. The reason AlphaGo, just as 
the student in Wittgensteins example does not go the route the Go-community, or the teacher, 
‘predicted’ is because AlphaGo had not been trained to think in a pre-defined route. To use 
Wittgensteins example and words; ‘These people are so trained that they all take the same step at the 
same point when they receive the order “+3”.’ (Wittgenstein 1953, pp. 82) It is not the way the other 
player (and the Go-community) had been trained (socialized) but it is the way the AI (just as the pupil) 
found accurate within the game and the prevalent rules of the game. The way humans learn to 
complete a series of numbers, to be scientist, or a golf player is through ‘playing the game’, through 
being part of society. AlphaGo used resources not available to the Go-community due to their social 
training into being a Go-player. AlphaGo found a solution that did not break the rules, and led to the 
goal in an unconventional way, a way that required improvisation, something Collins has described as 
a necessary part of CTK, which he hold only humans have and an AI cannot gain.  
Keeping Collins theory in mind the way AlphaGo’s style of playing was received by the Go-
community, especially the questions raised do imply that the community is influenced, and that it will 
(or at least can) have impact on the cultural setting of the Go-community, in which it acted. In this 
way AlphaGo’s playing style will (or at least can) be part of the way future Go-players address the 
game, and maybe even how they are trained and play the game.  
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Remaining for future investigations are the following questions; Could Collins epistemological theory 
be developed in order to show and become an argument against the possibility of a general AI? If not 
what implications does Collins epistemological theory have for at future inhabited by humanoid robots 
and humans? Since Collins arguments against the possibility of a general AI is not solid enough, is 
there something that he has missed? Could a solid theory against AI be formulated, one using a 
constructionist approach?  
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